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COMMONWEALTH~ WALKER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Commonwealth v. Walkeri the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas­
sachusetts ruled out, once and for all, the use of polygraph tests2 to 
impeach nonparty witnesses in criminal cases. The decision, culminat­
ing a series of recent rulings that have been steadily eroding the use of 
the "lie detector" in the state's criminal courts, has effectively made 
prosecution witnesses immune from impeachment by polygraph while 
criminal defendants remain exposed. 
In 1982, the mother of an illegitimate child alleged nonsupport 
against William E. Walker. 3 Before his arraignment, Walker and the 
complainant, with the advice of her attorney, stipulated that she 
would take a polygraph examination and that neither side would ob­
ject to admission of the results at tria1.4 The subsequent examination 
indicated the woman had lied when she denied having had sexual in­
tercourse with another man just two nights prior to her rendezvous 
with the defendant. 5 After conduding that the test had been properly 
conducted,6 the trial judge agreed to admit the evidence for impeach­
1. 392 Mass. 152,466 N.E.2d 71 (1984). 
2. The polygraph "is a scientific device which through measurement and recording 
of involuntary bodily responses - blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, and skin resistance 
to electricity - seeks to determine whether an individual is telling the truth." Common­
wealth v. A Juvenile (No. I), 365 Mass. 421, 426, 313 N.E.2d 120, 124 (1974). 
Because of the complexity of the science of polygraph testing, a more detailed explana­
tion is not possible here. For a concise overview of the polygraph process, see Common­
wealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 426, 431-40, 381 N.E.2d 582,586-90 (1978). For more detail, 
see J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 
1977) [hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU]. 
3. 392 Mass. at 12, 466 N.E.2d at 71. Massachusetts General Laws provide: 
Any parent of an illegitimate child . . . who neglects or refuses to contribute 
reasonably to its support and maintenance, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. If 
there has been any final adjudication of the paternity of the child, such adjudica­
tion shall be conclusive on all persons in proceedings under this section; other­
wise, the question of paternity shall be determined in proceedings hereunder 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273 § 15 (West Supp. 1983). 
4. 392 Mass. at 153,466 N.E.2d at 72. 
5. Id. The woman's New Year's Eve escort could not be located within Massachu­
setts. Id. 
6. A judge must make this finding before he may admit any polygraph evidence. See 
infra note 16. 
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ment purposes over the Commonwealth's objection.7 Prior to trial, 
however, the judge reported the case for a ruling on admissibility.s 
The court's holding in Walker was explicit: "We today an­
nounce the rule that the polygraph test results of a nonparty witness 
are not admissible in evidence in a criminal trial. This rule will apply 
regardless of whether the witness, the defendant, and the Common­
wealth have signed a stipulation agreeing to admissibility."9 
II. BACKGROUND 
The rule is simple to understand. The reasoning behind it is not, 
however, if one looks solely to the text of the Walker opinion for en­
lightenment. Although the court carefully traced the history of its 
earlier polygraph decisions,1O when the court finally stated the new 
rule, it did so with scant reference to the logic of the case law it had 
just cited. I I Still, to understand the origins of the Walker decision and 
its significance, some background knowledge of the 20-year history of 
polygraphs in the Massachusetts courts is necessary. 
The supreme judicial court first considered the admissibility of 
polygraph results in Commonwealth v. Fatalo. 12 There, the court held 
that polygraphic evidence was simply not reliable enough to be admis­
sible. 13 Such stringent opposition to polygraphs, however, came under 
fire throughout the country and in 1974 the Massachusetts court 
7. The prosecution objected to the defendant's efforts to get the results admitted on 
the grounds that the Commonwealth had not been a party to the agreement. 392 Mass. at 
154, 466 N.E.2d at 72. 
The distinction between a stipulation by the Commonwealth and one by the com­
plaining witness in a nonsupport case is a dubious one because it is in reality the "non­
party" who stands to benefit from a successful prosecution. While the woman's stipulation 
in Walker apparently troubled the trial judge, the supreme judicial court declared the issue 
of stipulation irrelevant. Id. at 159,466 N.E. 2d at 75. See infra note 9 and accompanying 
text. While the question of the validity of stipulations by a complaining witness is an 
interesting topic, it is beyond the scope of this note. 
8. 392 Mass. at 154, 466 N.E.2d at 72. The case was transferred to the supreme 
judicial court on the high court's motion. Id. at 152, 466 N.E.2d at 71. 
9. Id. at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 75. 
10. Id. at 154-59,466 N.E.2d at 72-75. 
11. Id. at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 75. 
12. 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963). 
13. Id. at 270, 191 N.E.2d at 481. See generally Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). 
The admissibility and reliability of the polygraph have been the subjects of numerous 
scholarly works. See, e.g. REID & INBAu, supra note 2; Axelrod, The Use ofLie Detectors 
by Criminal Defense Attorneys 3 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 107 (1977); Lester, Polygraph Evi­
dence: Are the Co~rts Failing to Keep Abreast ofModern Technology?, 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 33 
(1981); Comment, The Admissibility ofPolygraph and Hypnotic Evidence to Test the Credi­
bility ofa Witness DET. C.L. REV. 97 (1982); and Comment, Polygraph: Perceiving Us or 
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seemed to relent. In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No.l)14 the court 
held that enough progress had been made in the science of polygraphic 
testing to warrant limited15 admissibility of a defendant's polygraph 
results when requested by the defendant and upon certain condi­
tions. 16 Despite the practical implications of A Juvenile (No.1), the 
court insisted it had not overruled Fatalo. 17 The significance of the 
court's claim became clear in the 1978 case of Commonwealth v. 
Vitello 18 in which the court began limiting the scope of the admissibil­
ity rule it had created just four years earlier. 19 
Deceiving Us?, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 84 (1981). For a more extensive list of secondary 
sources see State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 234 n.2, 307 N.W.2d 628, 631-32 n.2 (1981). 
14. 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974). 
15. Apart from the preconditions, see infra note 16, the admission was "limited" 
only in the sense that the polygraph results were to be treated as just another piece of 
substantive evidence and not as conclusive proof. Id. at 425-26, 313 N.E.2d at 124. 
16. Id. at 425, 313 N .E.2d at 124. The conditions were that the defendant had to 
agree before taking the test that the results would be admissible, and that the trial judge 
had to be convinced of the qualifications of the examiner, of the fitness of the defendant to 
take the exam, and that the methods used to administer the test were proper. Finally, the 
court had to be satisfied that the defendant's constitutional rights had been fully protected. 
Id. at 425-26, 313 N.E.2d at 124. 
Interestingly, while the defendant won for posterity the court's recognition of poly­
graphic evidence, he never succeeded in having his own test results admitted at trial. On 
remand, the trial judge, still reluctant to admit the test results, reported the case back to the 
supreme judicial court for clarification of a number of procedural matters. The supreme 
judicial court held that the trial court was not obliged to admit the results of the original 
test because it had been conducted without prior stipulation and therefore did not meet the 
high court's threshold requirement. 370 Mass. 450, 453-54, 348 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1976). 
Furthermore, the original examiner had since testified that a second test would not be 
"meaningful," given all that had transpired since the first test. Id. at 452-53, n.2 348 
N.E.2d at 762, n.2. Because the court would not accept the results of the first test, and 
because the defendant was unfit to take a new test, the supreme judicial court affirmed the 
trial judge's decision not to grant a new trial "in the interest of ending this prolonged 
litigation." Id. at 454, 348 N.E.2d at 763. 
17. A Juvenile (No.1), 365 Mass. at 434 n.ll, 313 N.E.2d at 128 n.ll. 
18. 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
19. Massachusetts was not alone in its reluctance to embrace the polygraph unequiv­
ocally. Although the "lie detector" has existed in one form or another since the 19th cen­
tury, it has remained extremely controversial and its acceptance by the various jurisdictions 
has been far from universal. Walker, 392 Mass. at 159, 381 N.E.2d at 75. 
Courts in Iowa, California, and North Dakota generally recognize polygraph results if 
there has been a prior stipulation, while states such as Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Nevada, Ohio, Washington, and Massachusetts recognize the results only if 
specified preconditions have been met. See Annot. 53 A.L.R.3d 1011-14 (Supp. 1984). 
Other states, such as Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and l11inois have blan­
ket bans on the use of polygraphs, even when there has been a stipulation. Id. at 1010. 
The ranks of those states opposing or embracing the polygraph are still changing and a 
trend is difficult to find. Some states, such as Georgia, have moved toward increased use of 
polygraphs. See, e.g. State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76,239 S.E.2d 324 (1977); Smith v. State, 
245 Ga. 205, 264 S.E.2d 215 (1980). Others, such as North Carolina and Wisconsin, have 
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Vitello was charged with armed robbery. As part of his strategy, 
the defense attorney moved for a polygraph test of his client "for the 
purpose of introducing its results into evidence. . . ."20 The results of 
the test proved unfavorable to the defendant. Over the defendant's 
objections, the trial judge allowed the introduction of the evidence in 
the prosecution's case-in-chieF1 and Vitello was convicted. The 
supreme judicial court reversed on the grounds that the trial court 
improperly admitted the polygraph evidence.22 
In a carefully articulated opinion, the Vitello court premised the 
creation of its polygraph admissibility policy on an evaluation of 
whether the probative value of such scientific evidence sufficiently out­
weighed the "costs" of introducing it. 23 Using that approach, the 
court stated that polygraphic evidence should never be admitted as 
part of either party's case-in-chief.24 It nevertheless held polygraph 
evidence admissible for impeachment or corroboration.25 
Even in the setting of impeachment and corroboration, however, 
the court did not leave the rule of admissibility intact for long. In 
Commonwealth v. Moore 26 the court apparently questioned the poly­
graph's viability in impeachment situations. The court held that a 
trial judge had not erred in refusing to admit test results that chal­
lenged veracity of a prosecution witness.27 That case was followed by 
rejected the polygraph altogether. See. e.g. State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 
(1983) (overruling State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1979»; State v. Dean, 
103 Wis. 2d 228,307 N.W.2d 628 (1981) (overruling State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 
216 N.W.2d 8 (1974». 
20. 376 Mass. at 427-28, 381 N.E.2d at 584. 
21. Id. at 428, 381 N.E.2d at 584. 
22. Id. at 428, 461, 381 N.E.2d at 584, 601. 
23. Id. at 450-51, 381 N.E.2d at 596. The supreme judicial court saw the costs as: 
confusion and prejudice of juries because of the misconception that the tests are infallible; 
waste of court time in cross-examining expert witnesses and satisfying the judge that the 
exam was properly administered; intrusion into the jury's function; limitation of scope of 
rebuttal, (first, because the examiner and not the opposing party chose the questions asked 
during the test and second, because a rebuttal expert would not have seen the subject's 
reactions firsthand); and finally, likelihood that, with common use, defendants will eventu­
ally get wise to the test's "tricks" and learn how to beat the machine. Id. at 451-52, 381 
N.E.2d at 596-97. 
24. Id. at 453, 381 N.E.2d at 597. 
25. Id. at 453-57, 381 N.E.2d at 597-99. It is interesting to note that the court, in 
ruling that such evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes, went much further 
than necessary. At Vitello's trial the evidence was specifically admitted as substantive 
proof of guilt and the court could have reversed the conviction without ever mentioning 
impeachment. For a possible explanation, see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
26. 379 Mass. 106, 393 N.E.2d 904 (1979). 
27. Id. at 114, 393 N.E.2d at 910. 
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Commonwealth v. Dilego.28 There, the court dealt with the other side 
of the same question and held that the prosecution could not corrobo­
rate the testimony of its own witness by use of a polygraph, "at least in 
the absence of a stipulation."29 
Despite the comprehensive nature of Vitello and the subsequent 
decisions in Moore and Dilego, the question remained whether a judge 
may allow defendants to use polygraph evidence to impeach prosecu­
tion witnesses. To that question, Walker provided an unequivocal 
"no." 
III. ANALYSIS 
Because of a paucity of analysis in Walker,30 difficulty arises in 
identifying the source of the holding. The ruling apparently flows 
more from the court's suspicion of polygraphic evidence than from the 
facts of the case. 31 The cases reflect the court's skepticism. In Vitello, 
for example, the court spent nine pages underscoring the unreliability 
inherent in the polygraph.32 The court's mistrust of polygraphs, how­
ever, is offset by its concern that criminal defendants not be unnecessa­
rily encumbered when deciding to take the stand in their own defense. 
In Vitello the court noted that sometimes defendants with prior crimi­
nal records do not testify because they fear their records make them 
less believable. A positive polygraph might nevertheless encourage 
some defendants to take the stand.33 
Indeed, Commonwealth v. Martin 34 illustrated the court's vision 
of how the polygraphs can encourage defendants to testify. Martin 
was indicted for rape, kidnapping, and assault and battery by means of 
28. 387 Mass. 394, 439 N.E.2d 807 (1982). 
29. Id. at 394, 439 N.E.2d at 807. 
30. For example, the court pointed out that one of Walker's arguments was that to 
refuse to admit the evidence in question would "violate his constitutional rights to due 
process of law and to confrontation of witnesses." 392 Mass. at 154, 466 N.E.2d at 72. 
The court, however, proceeded to rule against Walker, dismissing his constitutional claims 
in a footnote as not having been properly raised. Id. at 160 n.3, 466 N.E.2d at 75 n.3. 
Furthermore, the court dismissed the claim that the evidence was exculpatory and there­
fore relevant at the end of the opinion with the somewhat circular observation that it is not 
admissible and therefore not relevant. Id. The court's reasoning is particularly confusing 
in light of its position that "[a]s a general proposition, a judge does not have discretion to 
exclude relevant evidence." Commonwealth v. Martin, 392 Mass. 161, 163,466 N.E.2d 76, 
78 (1984). Martin was decided the same day as Walker. 
31. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
32. 376 Mass. at 431-40, 381 N.E.2d at 586-90. 
33. Id. at 455, 381 N.E.2d at 598. 
34. 392 Mass. 161,466 N.E.2d 76 (1984). 
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a deadly weapon.35 Martin had a prior conviction for similar offenses 
but he also had an exculpatory polygraph.36 Although the trial judge 
found that the examiner was qualified and the test properly conducted, 
he exercised his discretion and refused to allow the defense to enter the 
corroborative test results into evidence.37 The supreme judicial court 
reversed, holding that the trial judge had no such discretionary 
power.38 
As Martin illustrates, in the context of impeachment and corrob­
oration39 of a defendant's testimony by use of hislher own polygraph 
results, the court is willing to put aside its grave misgivings about the 
scientific reliability of the evidence. Under those circumstances, the 
court finds the polygraph to be "arguably a more direct, and more 
accurate, means of aiding the jury in judging the credibility of a wit­
ness than ... the introduction of past criminal behavior."40 It also 
found that the costs represent an acceptable trade-off for the benefit of 
encouraging the defendants to testify.41 
Clearly, admitting the disputed test results in Walker would not 
have affected the defendant's decision to testify one way or another, 
while admission in Martin would have. In that sense both cases fol­
lowed the earlier stated policies. Martin flowed smoothly from the 
prior case law. Walker, on the other hand, is open to serious criticism. 
Vitello drives home the underlying lesson, common to all evi­
dence cases, that the costs of admitting evidence must be weighed 
against the benefits.42 Arguably, the application of the balancing test 
justifies outlawing the use of polygraph results as substantive proof of 
35. Id. at 161, 466 N.E.2d at 77. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. The trial court did so on the grounds that it had already excluded evidence of 
Martin's prior convictions and that Martin had other evidence supporting his alibi. Id. at 
161-62, 466 N.E.2d at 77. The trial judge's action was by no means illogical. He appar­
ently recognized the supreme judicial court's stated connection between impeachment by 
prior criminal conduct and the admissibility of corroborative polygraphs as a quid pro quo 
and simply chose to deal with the problem by excluding the prior record rather than admit­
ting the polygraph. The high court, however, was not willing to go that far. 
38. Id. at 163, 466 N.E.2d at 78. 
39. As opposed to the ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
40. Vitello, 376 Mass. at 455, 381 N.E.2d at 598. 
41. The court could, of course, ban the use of polygraphs for impeachment of a de­
fendant's testimony but continue to allow their use for corroboration. Such a distinction 
would further advance the court's goal of encouraging defendants to testify because a de­
fendant with an unfavorable polygraph would likely be discouraged from testifying if the 
test results were available for impeachment. The court, however, treats impeachment and 
corroboration as two sides of the same coin and is unwilling to separate them. See id. at 
451-53, 381 N.E.2d at 596-97. 
42. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
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guilt or innocence while allowing their use for impeachment. It does 
not necessarily follow, however, that results which would normally be 
admissible for impeachment are somehow less probative simply be­
cause they relate to the veracity of a prosecution witness instead of a 
defendant. This reasoning, however, appears to be the basic premise 
of Walker.43 The supreme judicial court, furthermore, chose to enun­
ciate its new rule in a paternity suit, a classic example of a case in 
which the court's reasoning does work. In cases such as Walker, the 
outcome depends as much on the credibility of the accusing witness as 
it does on the credibility of the defendant.44 In Walker the test results 
indicated that the accusing witness lied about a very significant fact. 
The court is willing to allow her to testify with the blemish on her 
credibility safely hidden from the jury. The defendant, on the other 
hand, possesses no power to hide the test results, short of sacrificing 
the right to testify in his own defense. 
The court's continued use of broad language45 when enunciating 
polygraph rules may shed light on the court's willingness to accept 
such uncomfortable results. The supreme judicial court appears to be 
looking beyond Walker, or the peculiarities of any other individual 
case, in search of predictability and a bright line test. In Martin, for 
example, the court expressed its fear that allowing the Common­
wealth's trial judges to exclude defendants' polygraph results "would 
grant virtually unreviewable discretion to trial judges, [and] would dis­
courage uniformity of treatment of defendants. "46 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Basically, the court does not trust the polygraph. Despite its ear­
lier efforts to accomodate the machine the court has ultimately 
adopted a rule of inadmissibility. The court has found only one policy 
43. The Walker court maintained that "[w]here the veracity of a witness [is not] as 
critical to the determination of guilt or innocence as the defendant's credibility would be," 
admission of polygraph evidence would not be warranted in light of the costs. 392 Mass. at 
158-59, 446 N.E.2d at 75 (citing Dilego, 387 Mass. at 397-98,439 N.E.2d at 809). In Dilego 
the court asserted that the credibility of a witness "generally" would not have "as direct a 
bearing on a defendant's guilt" as the defendant's own testimony. 387 Mass. at 397, 439 
N.E.2d at 809. The court did not explain why Walker fell within its "general" rule. 
44. Owing to the generally private nature of people's sexual proclivities, paternity 
litigation will frequently come to a choice between believing the accusing witness or believ­
ing the defendant. Generally there will be no other witnesses to the alleged act. Logically, 
the woman's credibility is no less significant than the man's. 
45. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Note also that in Vitello the court 
spoke generally of hypothetical defendants who might benefit from the corroboration rule. 
376 Mass. at 455,381 N.E.2d at 598. See also Dilego, 387 Mass. at 397, 439 N.E.2d at 809. 
46. 392 Mass. at 163, 466 N.E.2d at 78 (emphasis added). 
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concern strong enough to warrant breaking the rule; the need to en­
courage defendants to testify when they feel it is in their interest to do 
so. When the testimony in question is that of a non-party witness, 
even if it be the accusing witness, the one overriding policy concern 
which justifies making the exception simply does not exist. While al­
lowing a case-by-case approach might have avoided the uncomfortable 
result in Walker, it could not have provided the kind of predictability 
of results that the court's approach to polygraph admissibility 
guarantees. 
David W. Schoolcraft 
